


Part 1



Political and Security Affairs

Regional Issues

Middle East

Situation in the Middle East

The 53rd General Assembly, like its predecessor, failed to adopt a positive resolution expressing support for the achievements of the peace process and calling for international support for the economic and social development of the Palestinian people. The draft resolution was withdrawn by the cosponsors after agreement could not be reached on controversial proposed changes to the text.

The United States continued to oppose a number of perennial resolutions on the Middle East (the Syrian Golan, Question of Palestine, Israeli Settlements, Palestinian Right to Self-Determination, and Israeli Practices). The United States opposes these resolutions because they address permanent status issues that are the subject of negotiations between the parties; they advocate activities or language incompatible with basic principles of the Middle East peace process; and/or they expend resources that could be used in more productive ways to improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

UN Interim Force in Lebanon

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 425 in March 1978 in response to an Israeli operation in southern Lebanon which, in turn, had followed an attack inside Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organization. UNIFIL was deployed in southern Lebanon and, at the end of the year, had a troop strength of 4,475. The Security Council extended the UNIFIL mandate for six-month periods twice in 1998, most recently by Security Council Resolution 1188 on July 30, 1998.

UN Disengagement Observer Force

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights in accordance with the U.S.-negotiated Israeli-Syrian agreement of May 1974. At the end of 1998, UNDOF had a troop strength of 1,033. There are no U.S. troops in the operation. The Security Council extended UNDOF's mandate at six-month intervals,

most recently on November 25 by Security Council Resolution 1211. Two Austrian peacekeepers were murdered in a still-unexplained incident on the Golan Heights in June 1997. There were no other significant incidents during the year

UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

The General Assembly adopted a group of seven resolutions on the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Voting on the resolutions was as follows: Resolution 53/46, "Assistance to Palestinian refugees," was adopted by a vote of 157 to 1, with 2 (U.S.) abstentions; Resolution 53/47, "Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," was adopted by consensus; Resolution 53/48, "Persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities," was adopted by a vote of 156 to 2 (U.S.), with 1 abstention; Resolution 53/49, "Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for higher education, including vocational training, for Palestine refugees," was adopted by a vote of 160 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention; Resolution 53/50, "Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," was adopted by a vote of 157 to 2 (U.S.), with 2 abstentions; Resolution 53/51, "Palestine refugees' properties and their revenues," was adopted by a vote of 156 to 2 (U.S.), with 1 abstention; and Resolution 53/52, "University of Jerusalem 'Al-Quds' for Palestine refugees," was adopted by a vote of 156 to 2 (U.S.), with 2 abstentions.

In its explanation of vote, the U.S. delegation underscored its long-standing commitment to the work of UNRWA, noting that the United States would continue to support UNRWA's important educational, health, social, and humanitarian relief programs. The U.S. delegation expressed criticism for the inclusion of politicized language in several of the resolutions, and urged that narrow political agendas be set aside so that UNRWA could receive the wholehearted support it deserves.

Iraq

Iraq's record of compliance with Security Council resolutions was poor in 1998. The Council adopted seven resolutions pertaining to Iraq during the year, more than for any other country.

Heightened tensions over Iraqi noncooperation with UN-mandated weapons inspectors early in the year abated after the Secretary General traveled to Baghdad in February and concluded a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) which bound Iraq to cooperate fully with inspection teams from the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Council endorsed the MOU in Resolution 1154 (March 2), warning "...that any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq."

During bimonthly reviews in February, April, June, and August, the Security Council found that Iraq had failed to comply with the Council's resolutions relating to the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. Among other deficiencies, Iraq failed to provide a compre-

hensive accounting of its prohibited weapons programs and capabilities, failed to return stolen Kuwaiti property or account for missing Kuwaiti nationals, failed to respect the human rights of its citizens, failed to end support for terrorism, and failed to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA.

On August 5, Iraq reneged on its MOU with the Secretary General by declaring the “suspension” of all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. On September 9, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1194, which included the Council’s decision not to conduct further bimonthly reviews until Iraq rescinded its August 5 decision and renewed cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Iraq announced “termination” of cooperation with UNSCOM on October 31. The Council, in turn, adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5), which identified Iraq’s action as a “flagrant violation” of Resolution 687 (the Gulf war cease-fire resolution) and demanded that Iraq immediately resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. In the face of continued Iraqi noncompliance with its obligation to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA, coalition forces were prepared to conduct air strikes against military targets in Iraq. Hostilities were averted by a sudden Iraqi decision on November 15 to rescind its August 5 and October 31 decisions.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspection teams returned to Iraq but again faced Iraqi interference and noncooperation. UNSCOM reported to the Council on December 16 that Iraq had failed to fulfill its pledge to cooperate. As a result, coalition air strikes against military targets across Iraq began December 17 and continued through December 20. The strikes, dubbed Operation Desert Fox, inflicted significant damage on military sites. UNSCOM and IAEA personnel departed Iraq just prior to the military action, and at year’s end Iraq maintained its policy of barring their return.

The United States remains a strong supporter of the UN humanitarian program in Iraq, under which Security Council resolutions require that Iraqi oil revenues benefit the civilian population. The Security Council adopted a series of resolutions during the year pertaining to the program, including: Resolution 1153 (February 20), which expanded the program to permit the sale of up to \$5.26 billion worth of oil every six months and extended the program for a fourth phase of 180 days; Resolution 1158 (March 25), which authorized the export of Iraqi crude oil up to a value of \$1.4 billion during the second half of phase four; Resolution 1175 (June 19), which sought to boost revenues for humanitarian assistance by making \$300 million available for purchase of oil sector equipment in order to increase oil exports; and Resolution 1210 (November 24), which extended the program for a fifth phase of 180 days.

Africa

Working Group on Reduction of Conflict

The Security Council’s first ministerial meeting on Africa, in September 1997, requested that the Secretary General report on “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development

in Africa.” The Secretary General submitted that report to the General Assembly (A/52/871) and the Security Council (S/1998/318) on April 13, 1998, winning praise for thoughtful analysis and comprehensive recommendations. In Resolution 1170 (May 28), the Security Council established a Working Group of all members of the Council to review all recommendations in the report related to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to submit specific proposals for consideration by the Council. The Council also expressed its intention to convene ministerial-level meetings biennially, beginning in September 1998, to assess progress in promoting peace and security in Africa.

The Working Group was divided into six thematic groups which addressed the following issues: (1) strengthening coordination between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace, (2) security and neutrality of refugee camps and settlements, (3) strengthening Africa’s peacekeeping capacity, (4) strengthening the effectiveness of arms embargoes as a means to diminish the availability of arms with which to pursue armed conflicts, (5) stemming illicit arms flows to and in Africa, and (6) enhancing the Council’s ability to monitor activities authorized by it, but carried out by member states or coalitions of states.

The Security Council held its second ministerial meeting on Africa on September 24. In her remarks to the Council, U.S. Secretary of State Albright noted that “...tragedy and conflict have led the news from Africa this year and it dominates our thoughts as we meet today....” She thanked the Secretary General “...for his engagement in these difficult challenges and we welcome the response his report has generated.” Turning to the themes being considered by the Africa Working Group, she congratulated the thematic group led by Japan for singling out “...the uncontrolled flow of arms, ammunition and explosives into Africa’s tensest areas.” She then called for “...international support, over the next six months, for a voluntary moratorium on arms sales that could fuel these interconnected conflicts...” and suggested other ways to curb arms transfers to zones of conflict in Africa.

The U.S. delegation chaired the thematic group on security and neutrality of refugee camps and settlements. With advice from an inter-agency working group in Washington and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the thematic group developed proposals which the Council unanimously adopted as Resolution 1208 (November 19). It called on African states to keep refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin, to separate refugees from persons who do not qualify for international protection, and to ensure the security and civilian and humanitarian character of the camps. It noted that the range of measures which the international community could take to share the burden borne by African states could include the provision of security guards and deployment of international police and military forces. It called for international support, including coordinated training programs and logistical and technical advice and assistance, for

African efforts in law enforcement, disarmament of armed elements and curtailment of arms flows in refugee camps, and demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.

The thematic group on stemming illicit arms flows to and in Africa, chaired by the Japan delegation, recommended a text (including some of the U.S. Secretary of State's September 24 proposals) which was unanimously adopted as Security Council Resolution 1209 (November 19). It encouraged African states to implement effective arms import, export, and re-export controls; stressed the importance of restricting arms transfers which could provoke or prolong armed conflicts, such as through voluntary moratoria; welcomed the Economic Community of West African States' moratorium on manufacture and trade in small arms; encouraged African states to examine other regional efforts, such as those of the Organization of American States; encouraged the Secretary General to explore means of identifying international arms dealers who contravene African States' legislation or UN embargoes; noted the findings of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) and requested that the Secretary General consider using commissions of inquiry in other conflict zones in Africa; and suggested that future peacekeeping operations in Africa might include voluntary weapons collection programs.

Results of the other thematic groups' work included the following highlights:

- Resolution 1196 (September 16) reiterated the obligation of all member states to carry out decisions of the Council on arms embargoes; encouraged member states to consider adopting legislation making the violation of UN arms embargoes a criminal offense; requested reporting on possible violations of arms embargoes to the Council's sanctions committees and asked the committees to make this information publicly available (e.g., on the Internet); and expressed willingness to consider all appropriate measures to assist in the effective implementation of arms embargoes.
- Presidential Statement 28 (September 16) encouraged increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation in peacekeeping, especially capacity-building, between member states, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and subregional organizations in Africa, with due emphasis on international humanitarian law and particular attention to the situation of children in armed conflict. It requested that the Secretary General study ways to improve the availability of logistics for peacekeeping efforts in Africa.
- Resolution 1197 (September 18) urged the Secretary General to help the OAU establish a conflict early-warning system and strengthen its conflict management center.
- Presidential Statement 35 (November 30) recommended that peacekeeping operations of coalitions or subregional organizations should have a clear mandate, including a statement of objectives, rules of engagement, a well-developed plan of action, a time-frame for disengagement, and arrangements for regular reporting to the Council. Co-deployment of UN observers with an operation of a subregional organization or coalition, as in Liberia and Sierra Leone is one possi-

ble means of monitoring activities of forces authorized by the Security Council.

Angola

The UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), established on June 30, 1997, as a follow-up to the UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), had a mandate to assist the Angolan parties in the final stages of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Despite significant progress early in the year, by year's end the civil war had resumed, and the prospects for peace in Angola were dim.

MONUA focused its efforts on implementing key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol: disarming and demobilizing the forces of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), closing UNITA's Radio Vorgan to reduce inflammatory propaganda, extending state administration throughout the country—including UNITA's key towns of Andulo and Bailundo, legalizing UNITA as a party and transferring UNITA's leadership to Luanda, and regularizing the status of UNITA's leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, and establishing a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN). By April 1998, it appeared that significant progress had been achieved. Not only had UNITA declared, on March 6, the complete demobilization of its forces, but, on March 11, the government had legalized UNITA as a political party and regularized Savimbi's constitutional status as leader of the opposition.

However, UNITA refused to turn over control of Andulo and Bailundo and two neighboring towns, Nharea and Mungo. Beginning in late April, UNITA launched a military campaign to retake control of towns it had given up only weeks earlier. UNITA's action, which it claimed was prompted by the severe harassment of its cadres in the towns brought under government control, not only created an impasse in the peace process but also confirmed suspicions that UNITA had not fully disarmed or demobilized. The Security Council strongly condemned UNITA's failure to abide by its Lusaka obligations and imposed additional sanctions on UNITA (Resolutions 1173 of June 12, and 1176 of June 24).

The tragic death of the Secretary General's Special Representative, Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye, in a plane crash in Cote d'Ivoire on June 26, was a further blow to the peace process. During the last six months of 1998, both sides took actions that made the resumption of hostilities a virtual certainty. As part of a campaign to isolate and discredit Savimbi, the Government suspended UNITA from the GURN (later rescinded); embraced as the "true" UNITA a splinter group of UNITA officials in Luanda; and outlawed Savimbi as a war criminal, declaring him no longer a legitimate interlocutor in the peace process. For its part, UNITA took advantage of the Government's military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August to retake control of territory, particularly in the diamond mining regions.

In December, the Government launched an offensive against the UNITA strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo, plunging Angola once again

into civil war. The year ended on a tragic note with the shooting down over UNITA-controlled areas, on December 26, 1998, and January 2, 1999, of 2 MONUA planes carrying 24 people. None survived.

As the peace process broke down, the Security Council kept MONUA under active review, adopting short-term renewals in resolutions. Beginning with the June 30 mandate renewal (Resolution 1180 of June 29), the Security Council limited subsequent renewals to two months or less (Resolutions 1190 of August 13; 1195 of September 15; and 1202 of October 15). On December 3, the mandate was extended until February 26 (Resolution 1213), although deteriorating security conditions compelled the Secretary General to begin a drawdown of MONUA forces at the end of the month and to consider recommending MONUA's termination. In light of the inability of MONUA to fulfill its peacekeeping mission, the Security Council at year-end was exploring what form of continued presence might make sense and began working with the Government of Angola on a framework for a residual UN mission if MONUA was not renewed on February 26, 1999.

Burundi

Important progress in the Burundi peace process took place over the year in both internal and external negotiations. In the internal process, the National Assembly and the Buyoya government worked out modalities for cooperation. In the external all-party talks at Arusha, Tanzania, led by former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, working committees began to debate issues for resolution, including democracy and good governance and peace and security. Because of progress in the peace talks, Nyerere recommended, and the regional leaders agreed, to suspend sanctions against Burundi. The United States and the United Nations continued to support the peace process.

The Burundian government and insurgents continued to fight throughout 1998. At the end of the year, there was an increase in killings of civilians by insurgents. The army was implicated in two civilian massacres. The United States urged the Government of Burundi to condemn the killings and to conduct a transparent investigation that would single out and punish those involved. The Security Council president, in a November 17 press statement, called for swift punishment of the guilty. At year's end, fighting between government troops and the insurgents was reported in eastern Congo.

Central African Republic

Following a series of mutinies in the Central African Republic in 1996, a group of African leaders negotiated the Bangui Accords in January 1997. These agreements created the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB), a multinational force with troops from Gabon, Senegal, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Togo, and financial and logistical support from France. In July 1997, President Ange-Felix Patasse of the Central African Republic and President El Hadj Omar Bongo of Gabon formally requested UN authorization for MISAB,

which was granted on August 6, 1997, by Security Council Resolution 1125, adopted unanimously. This three-month MISAB mandate authorized its member states to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution stipulated that the expenses and logistical support for the force would continue to be borne on a voluntary basis by MISAB's participants. On November 6, 1997, Security Council Resolution 1136, adopted unanimously, renewed this authorization of MISAB under the same terms for an additional three months.

In early 1998, the UN mandate for MISAB was twice extended for short periods by the Security Council while it was considering further steps it could take to help bring stability and reform to the Central African Republic. On February 5, Security Council Resolution 1152 extended MISAB through March 16. On March 16, Security Council Resolution 1155 extended MISAB's mandate through March 27. Both Security Council votes were unanimous. On March 27, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1159, creating the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), which replaced MISAB. MINURCA's mandate was to guarantee security in the capital, Bangui, while the Government implemented critical political, economic, and security reforms that would ensure long-term stability. MISAB's sponsors continued much of their support with personnel, equipment, and voluntary contributions in what was, for the most part, a transfer from one command to another. MINURCA came to include new contingents from France, Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, and Egypt, but continued under African (Gabonese) command. In his explanation of vote, U.S. Permanent Representative Bill Richardson emphasized that MINURCA was a limited but essential peacekeeping mission "...designed as a temporary bridge to give the Central African Republic time to establish a secure state under good governance." Richardson also encouraged formation of a "Friends of the Central African Republic" group to help coordinate economic assistance and to advise on reform.

MINURCA deployed without incident. With MINURCA keeping the peace in Bangui, and with some reform progress being made by the Central African Republic Government, the Security Council, on July 14, unanimously adopted Resolution 1182, renewing the MINURCA mandate for three more months, through October 25.

On August 21, the Secretary General's report recommended that MINURCA's mandate be adjusted for it to be present and assist with logistical and security support during the national legislative elections in November and December 1998. Correspondingly, the Security Council, on October 15, unanimously adopted Resolution 1201, extending MINURCA's mandate through February 28, 1999. This resolution expressed the Council's clear intent that this would be MINURCA's final extension, setting a force drawdown beginning January 15, with termination of MINURCA to be concluded by February 28, 1999.

The legislative elections were successfully held, but the government's progress in essential reforms was more mixed. On December 18, the Secretary General's report recommended extension of MINURCA through presidential elections, scheduled for the fall of 1999. The Secretary General was concerned that reforms were not yet complete, and the presidential election itself would be destabilizing. As 1998 closed, MINURCA's end-date of February 28, 1999, was still in effect, with the Security Council poised to extend it through the presidential elections in the fall of 1999.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)

The situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa continued to preoccupy the Security Council during 1998. In the first half of the year, the Council tried, without success, to encourage the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) to cooperate with a UN investigation of massacres and other atrocities that took place in 1996 and 1997, during the rebellion that led to the overthrow of President Mobutu. Beginning in August, it expressed deep concern about the outbreak of a new rebellion and multi-state intervention in the Congo.

In April, the Secretary General ordered the withdrawal of the UN Investigative Team, because "...it was not allowed to carry out its mission fully and without hindrance." The Team's report (S/1998/581 of June 29), based on interviews it was able to conduct in-country, concluded "...that all the parties to the violence that racked Zaire...committed serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law." Furthermore, the killings by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) "...and its allies, including elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Army, constitute crimes against humanity...." The Team believed "...that some of the killings may constitute genocide, depending on their intent, and call for further investigation...." The Congolese Government submitted a detailed rebuttal of the Team's report on June 29. The Rwandan Government issued a letter on June 29 claiming that the report was based on incomplete information.

On July 13, the Security Council issued Presidential Statement 20 condemning the massacres, other atrocities, and violations of international humanitarian law and calling on the Governments of the Congo and Rwanda to investigate without delay the allegations of the UN Investigative Team and bring to justice any persons found to be involved in massacres and atrocities. It asked those Governments to provide initial progress reports to the Secretary General by October 15, 1998, on the steps being taken to investigate and prosecute those responsible. Both Governments submitted reports at that time, but they were *pro forma*. In the meantime, a new war had broken out in the Congo.

In early August, a new rebel movement proclaimed itself in eastern Congo and, in cooperation with Rwandan and Ugandan government forces already on the ground in the Congo, began a campaign to overthrow the government of President Laurent Kabila. In late August, the rebels and their allies threatened Kinshasa from a front established by an airlift into

the west, but were repelled with the aid of intervening Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops. On August 31, the Security Council, in Presidential Statement 26, expressed deep concern about the conflict, calling it a serious threat to regional peace and security. The Council reaffirmed the obligation to respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other states in the region and called for a peaceful solution to the conflict, including an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and the initiation of peaceful political dialogue with a view to national reconciliation leading to democratic, free, and fair elections as soon as possible. The Council urged all parties to respect human rights and humanitarian law. It condemned reported summary executions, torture, harassment and detention of civilians based on their ethnic origin, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, the killing of combatants who lay down their weapons, hate propaganda, sexual violence, and other abuses by any side. It reaffirmed that all persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for their actions. The Council also called for safe and unhindered access for humanitarian agencies to all those in need, and unrestricted access by the International Committee of the Red Cross to all detainees. It urged all parties to guarantee the safety and security of UN and humanitarian personnel. Finally, the Council encouraged the Secretary General to continue consultations with regional leaders and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) aimed at achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict. It reaffirmed the importance of holding an international conference on peace, security, and development in the Great Lakes region.

About a dozen state and non-state actors intervened in the Congo conflict. By late 1998, Congolese rebels and their Rwandan and Ugandan allies controlled most of eastern Congo. Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, the former armed forces of Rwanda and Rwandan Hutu extremists, Burundian Hutu rebels, and Ugandan rebels supported the Kabila government. President Chiluba of Zambia, with the endorsement of the OAU and the Southern African Development Community, led regional efforts to resolve the conflict; the United Nations supported this effort.

The United States was especially concerned about the danger of renewed genocide in the region. In statements at the United Nations, the United States opposed ethnic killing and expressed concern about appeals to ethnic hatred. The United States supported the territorial integrity of the Congo and a peaceful settlement of the conflict. It urged Rwanda and Uganda to cooperate in reaching a peaceful settlement and called on the international community to enforce the arms embargo on the Rwandan *genocidaires* and redouble efforts to limit arms flows to this major region of conflict.

On December 11, the Security Council issued Presidential Statement 36 repeating most of the elements of its August 31 Statement and expressing its support for the mediation process led by President Chiluba. It wel-

comed public commitments—made in late November at the France-Africa summit in Paris by the presidents of the Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda, and by the presidents or heads of delegation of Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Chad—to work in a constructive and flexible spirit toward signing a cease-fire agreement. At the end of 1998, however, the planned summit for the signing had been postponed indefinitely.

In Presidential Statement 36 of December 11, the Council said it was prepared to consider “...the active involvement of the United Nations,... through concrete, sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective cease-fire agreement and an agreed process for a political settlement of the conflict.”

Ethiopia/Eritrea

The Governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia, antagonists in the current border conflict, are former brothers in arms who ousted the Mengistu regime in 1991. When Eritrea peacefully achieved independence from Ethiopia in 1993, the common border remained undefined in some places. Occasional border skirmishes went almost unnoticed until May 1998, when Eritrea seized the 150-square-mile Badme triangle. Ethiopia demanded that Eritrea withdraw from Badme, and both sides began preparing for war.

In May and June, a U.S.-Rwandan team of peace facilitators shuttled between Asmara and Addis Ababa, promoting a plan that would lead to delimitation and demarcation of the border with UN technical assistance. Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki would not agree, however, to withdraw from Badme. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi accepted the facilitators’ plan but reiterated that Eritrean forces must withdraw from Badme and Ethiopian administration must be restored before negotiations could begin.

Fighting broke out in late May but settled into a *de facto* cease-fire in June. President Clinton prevailed upon Isaias and Meles to observe a moratorium on air attacks, which lasted from June into 1999. However, in June, Ethiopia began expelling Eritreans and persons with alleged ties to Eritrea. By year’s end about 50,000 had been deported to Eritrea. About 18,000 Ethiopians had left Eritrea.

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) endorsed the U.S.-Rwandan facilitation plan (S/1998/485) and when the U.S.-Rwandan facilitation ended in June, an OAU High-Level Delegation continued the peace efforts. The UN Security Council followed the conflict with grave concern, noting its political and security implications and its effect on civilian populations. On June 26, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1177, which condemned the use of force and demanded that both parties immediately cease hostilities and refrain from further use of force; welcomed the commitment of the parties to a moratorium on air strikes; urged the parties to exhaust all means to achieve a peaceful settlement; welcomed the OAU decision (S/1998/494) to involve its High-Level Delegation; called upon the parties to cooperate fully with

the OAU and to avoid provocative actions or statements; asked the Secretary General to make available his good offices and to provide technical support to the parties to assist in the eventual delimitation and demarcation of the border; and established a trust fund for that purpose and urged all member states to contribute to it.

Beginning in October, former U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake traveled three times to Eritrea and Ethiopia, attempting to identify a formula for a peaceful resolution of the impasse. In December, at Ouagadougou, OAU heads of state endorsed a proposed Framework Agreement, involving redeployment of Eritrean forces, presence of OAU military observers and human rights monitors, and delimitation and demarcation of the common border by experts of the UN Cartographic Unit. Ethiopia accepted the Framework Agreement; Eritrea requested clarifications. As 1998 ended, full-scale war was becoming increasingly likely. Both sides were importing tanks, jet fighters, other weapons, and munitions. Over 100,000 Eritrean and over 200,000 Ethiopian troops faced each other along a 620-mile front; artillery exchanges were becoming more frequent.

At the end of 1998, the Security Council remained seized of the matter. The United States remained deeply concerned about the continuing military buildup along the common border and the implications of the buildup for renewed hostilities. It continued to coordinate its peace efforts with the United Nations and the OAU, and strongly endorsed the Framework Agreement advanced by the OAU for ending the dispute. The United States welcomed Ethiopia's acceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement, urged Ethiopian patience, and strongly urged Eritrea to accept the Framework Agreement as the basis for a peaceful resolution of the dispute, without delay. Ethiopia and Eritrea have made remarkable strides in the last few years in overcoming a past of repression, famine, and war. Both nations have promising futures. The United States urged them not to risk what they have gained in a conflict that cannot possibly benefit the people of either side.

Libya

During the first eight months of 1998, the Security Council continued to review sanctions each 120 days as required by Resolution 748 (1992) (to force Libya "...to cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts...against Pan Am flight 103.") Given Libya's noncompliance with Resolutions 731, 748, and 883, the Council decided on each occasion that sanctions, including the air embargo, should remain in effect without change. Libya continued to complain that the air embargo was harming civilian interests, and to call for the trial of the two Pan Am 103 suspects under Scottish law in a country other than the United Kingdom or the United States.

The situation changed dramatically with the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1192 on August 27. The resolution embodied an initiative launched by the United States and the United Kingdom earlier in August. The United Kingdom will try the two Libyan suspects before a

specially constituted Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. The Dutch parliament passed legislation to authorize and facilitate such an arrangement. Resolution 883 had provided for immediate suspension of UN sanctions once Libya ensured the appearance of the two suspects before the appropriate U.S. or U.K. court and had satisfied the French judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA 772. The initiative, as reflected in Resolution 1192, expanded the circumstances under which sanctions would be suspended to include arrival of the suspects in the Netherlands for the purpose of trial before the Scottish court.

Despite favorable comments on the initiative by senior Libyan officials, the Libyan government raised numerous procedural questions and concerns, and refused to surrender the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects. As a result, Libya faced increasing diplomatic pressure and international isolation by year's end. The Secretary General visited Tripoli to urge the Libyan leadership to comply with Resolution 1192. The governments of Saudi Arabia and South Africa undertook a joint diplomatic effort to persuade Libya to comply.

(NB: On April 5, 1999, the two Libyan suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing arrived in the Netherlands and were turned over to Scottish custody for trial.)

Rwanda

The current African Great Lakes crisis arose in large measure from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The 1996-1997 military campaign that ousted President Mobutu of Zaire, the rebellion against his successor, President Kabila, and the continuing war and multi-state intervention in the Congo are all linked to Rwandan *genocidaires'* activities in Congo/Zaire and the efforts of the post-genocide Government of Rwanda to destroy these remaining enemies. (See report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, above.) In 1998, the UN Security Council focused on two Rwandan issues arising out of the genocide: the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Commission of Inquiry established in 1995 to collect information on the sale or supply of arms and related *materiel* to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region in violation of Council Resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995), and 1011 (1995).

With strong U.S. support, operations of the International Tribunal for Rwanda gained momentum in 1998. At the end of the year, 36 of the 45 public indictees, many of them senior leaders of the Rwandan government before and during the genocide, had been taken into custody and the Tribunal had obtained two confessions and one conviction for genocide charges.

Convinced of the need to increase the capacity of the Tribunal, to enable it to try expeditiously the large number of accused, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council adopted Resolution 1165 (April 30), which established a third Trial Chamber, with three additional judges. The resolution also urged the organs of the Tribunal to continue their efforts to increase the efficiency of their

work, and asked the Secretary General to make practical arrangements for elections for judges of the three Trial Chambers for a term of office to expire on May 24, 2003. Per Resolution 1200 (September 30), the Council forwarded to the General Assembly the nominations of 18 persons to become judges of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. On November 3, the General Assembly elected nine of the nominees to become judges. The 1999 budget for the Tribunal was scheduled to increase to about \$75 million, 44 percent over the 1998 budget of \$52 million.

Beginning in March 1998, the United States sponsored a resolution in the Security Council to reactivate the International Commission of Inquiry on arms flows in the Great Lakes region (established by Resolution 1013 (1995)), because of continuing violence in Rwanda, including attacks by the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militias (Rwandan Hutu extremists), and related violence in Burundi and eastern Congo. The Commission had completed its third report in November 1996, just as fighting erupted in the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Congo (then Zaire). The Commission had recommended that its work be extended, having begun to uncover evidence of significant movement through the Great Lakes region of weapons, funds, and members of the former Rwandan government, ex-FAR, and Interahamwe, many of whom were implicated in the genocide. However, due to the lack of security in eastern Zaire at that time, the Council had not acted on the Commission's recommendations and the Commission's third report was not published until January 12, 1998 (as UN Document S/1997/1010, dated December 24, 1997).

As a result of the U.S. initiative the Security Council on April 9 adopted Resolution 1161, which asked the Secretary General to reactivate the Commission, with a mandate to collect information and investigate reports relating to the sale, supply, and shipment of arms and related *matériel* to former Rwandan government forces and militias in the Great Lakes region; to identify parties aiding and abetting the illegal sale to or acquisition of arms by former Rwandan government forces and militias; and to make recommendations relating to the illegal flow of arms in the Great Lakes region. The Council also urged all states and relevant organizations to cooperate in countering radio broadcasts and publications that incite acts of genocide, hatred, and violence in the region.

The United States contributed \$100,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for Rwanda to help finance the work of the Commission and seconded a U.S. Government official who had served on the previous Commission to serve on the new one.

On August 19, the Commission submitted an interim report (S/1998/777), which noted that after its 19-month absence from the region, "...violent upheavals have left remnants of the ex-FAR scattered across the African continent, to the point where the first task facing the Commission was to establish their whereabouts and current activities...." The report complained of dilatory tactics by some states in not cooperating with the Com-

mission, noted the determination of other governments to curtail the illegal shipment of arms from and through their territory, and suggested that the scale of illegal trafficking may exceed "...the present capacity of the Governments concerned to control it in full accordance with their laws." Concerning ex-FAR operations inside Rwanda, it noted that whereas the ex-FAR were believed to possess sophisticated armaments, they tended to use "...machetes rather than firearms for psychological effect." It observed that Burundian insurgents, ex-Zairian soldiers, and Ugandan rebels "...are aiding and abetting the ex-FAR and closely collaborating with them, including in violations of the UN embargo." The Commission requested an invitation to visit the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but was not able to visit, because of the outbreak of a new war in that country.

On November 18, the Commission issued its final report (S/1998/1096).

Sierra Leone

Throughout 1998, the United States worked, through the United Nations and bilaterally, to support the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group), in its efforts to secure Sierra Leonean territory and back the democratically elected government of President Kabbah. In February, ECOMOG troops recaptured the capital, Freetown, and most major cities from a junta composed of military mutineers and the eight-year-old Revolutionary United Front (RUF) guerrilla movement. The Security Council, in Resolution 1156, welcomed the reinstatement of President Kabbah, and ended the sanctions on the sale of petroleum to Sierra Leone that had been imposed the previous year. In Resolution 1171, the Security Council exempted ECOMOG from sanctions and determined that the remaining sanctions (on foreign travel and arms sales) would apply only to non-state entities in Sierra Leone.

The Security Council, in Resolution 1162 of April 17, authorized up to 10 military observers, funded through peacekeeping assessments, to join the office of the Secretary General's Special Envoy. The observers were tasked with assessing the security situation and making recommendations about a future disarmament program. The resolution also commended the Economic Community of West African States and ECOMOG for their efforts to restore peace and stability in Sierra Leone.

Based in part on the observers' recommendations, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) on July 13. Resolution 1181 authorized UNOMSIL to assist ECOMOG with a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants; monitor human rights; and advise the Sierra Leonean Government on building a civilian police force. UNOMSIL was authorized up to 70 military observers, but never deployed more than 42; full deployment was contingent on progress in the demobilization program and adequate security conditions.

RUF rebels continued to attack pro-government forces and ECOMOG, and to commit atrocities against the civilian population. In a major offensive at year's end, the rebels pushed ECOMOG forces from most major cities and threatened to take Freetown. All UNOMSIL and other UN personnel were evacuated. In the last days of 1998, Security Council members were considering a rollover of UNOMSIL's mandate, and encouraging UNOMSIL to draw down to appropriate levels in the light of changed circumstances.

Somalia

The United Nations was involved in regional efforts to negotiate reconciliation among the Somali factions, and the United States supported these efforts. The Secretary General appointed a Special Representative, David Stephens, in September. Stephens and representatives of the UN Political Office for Somalia met with factional leaders to encourage them to accept a negotiated settlement. Regional entities such as the Organization of African Unity, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, and the Arab League took the lead in negotiations throughout 1997. In January, Ethiopia convened the Soderre Conference, which led to the establishment of the National Salvation Council. Talks held at Egypt's initiative led to the December 22 Cairo Declaration, which called for the formation of a central National Reconciliation Government. The Cairo Declaration was signed by many, but not all, of Somalia's factions. On December 23, a Security Council presidential statement lauded these regional efforts to negotiate a settlement, and noted that the ultimate responsibility for success rested with the Somalis, themselves.

Western Sahara

MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 690 of April 29, 1991, to assist in the implementation of the Settlement Plan agreed to in 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). The plan called for a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum on whether the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara should become independent or be integrated with Morocco.

Since then, progress in implementing the plan has been frustratingly slow. In 1996, in response to a protracted stalemate between the parties over the voter identification process, the Secretary General suspended MINURSO's operations, sharply reducing its international staff and troop strength. Secretary General Kofi Annan's appointment, in February 1997, of former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as his Personal Envoy brought new energy to the process. Baker mediated a series of direct meetings between the parties that resulted in a new set of implementation guidelines relating to, *inter alia*, the identification of the non-contested and contested tribal subfactions which were finalized in the Houston Agreement of September 1997.

Retired U.S. Ambassador Charles Dunbar became the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the ground in the Western Sahara in February 1998. His new management team reinvigorated the identification process and by September had registered 147,350 members of the non-contested Sahrawi tribal members, including 60,112 during the first phase from August 1994 to December 1995, and 87,238 since its resumption in December 1997.

However, the disposition of the 65,000 members of the contested tribal subfactions remained a sticking point as it had from the beginning of the Settlement Plan. The core of the dispute is that most of the members of this group are long-term residents of Morocco and do not appear on the Spanish Sahara Census of 1974. The POLISARIO claims that they are therefore ineligible, while Morocco insists that, as Sahrawi, they should be included in the voter identification process. The voter identification procedures set by the Houston Agreement broke down and little progress on this issue was achieved after March 1998.

In an effort to break the impasse, Baker proposed in October 1998 that the Secretary General offer the parties a package of four protocols to be initialed and implemented without negotiation beginning in December. The protocols related to the identification of eligible voters from the contested tribes; the appeals process; the activities of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; and a timetable for the next stages of the Settlement Plan. A key element of the package was the simultaneity of the identification and appeals processes designed to accelerate the referendum process. The protocols were referenced in Resolution 1204, adopted on October 30. Although the POLISARIO accepted the package in December, Morocco did not, and sought instead to negotiate changes in the protocols.

The Secretary General, in his report of December 11, recommended extending MINURSO's mandate only until January 31, 1999, to give Morocco time to reach agreement on the package of protocols. He also warned that if the prospects for completing the identification process remained uncertain at that time, he would ask his Personal Envoy "...to reassess the situation and the viability of the mandate of MINURSO." This recommendation was adopted in Resolution 1215 on December 17.

Western Hemisphere

Cuba

The United Nations Human Rights Commission, on April 21, failed to adopt the U.S.-sponsored resolution (E/CN.4/1998/L.89) on the human rights situation in Cuba by a vote of 16 (U.S.) to 19, with 18 abstentions. This represented a reversal from 1997, when the Human Rights Commission adopted a similar resolution on human rights in Cuba by a vote of 19 (U.S.) to 10, with 24 abstentions.

On October 14, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 53/4, by a vote of 157 to 2 (U.S.), with 12 abstentions. The Cuban-sponsored resolution called on states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws "...such as...the 'Helms-Burton Act,'" the extraterritorial effects of which

affect the sovereignty of other states, and urged states that have such laws to repeal them. A number of countries, notably Argentina, Norway, and Costa Rica, voted in favor of the resolution but expressed concern about Cuba's poor human rights record in their explanations of vote. Austria, speaking on behalf on the European Union, also made clear that full cooperation with Cuba depended on an improvement in human rights and political freedom.

Guatemala

The United States strongly supports efforts to assist the Guatemalan Government in implementing the peace agreement signed on December 29, 1996, ending that country's 36-year internal struggle.

The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) continued to verify compliance with the agreements signed between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. The General Assembly acted to extend MINUGUA's mandate until December 31, 1999 (Resolution 53/93).

MINUGUA maintained eight regional offices and six subregional offices, providing it with a presence throughout the country. MINUGUA conducted prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into alleged human rights abuses; worked to improve the administration of justice; and aided in opening access to the government for indigenous people. Human rights abuses have continued to decline, but common crime and violence remain significant problems.

Haiti

On November 25, the Security Council extended the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) for one year by a unanimous vote (U.S.) with 2 abstentions (Resolution 1212). Established in November 1997 to further support and contribute to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP), MIPONUH was authorized 300 civilian police personnel, including up to 150 mentoring officers and a 140-man Special Police Unit staffed with Argentine *gendarmes*. Civilian police officers from the United States, Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Tunisia participate in MIPONUH.

The Secretary General reported that the 6,000-member HNP continued to make measured progress during 1998 toward greater professionalization. Steps were taken to increase HNP strength to 6,700 personnel, and upgrade the number and quality of supervisory and managerial personnel. The HNP measurably enhanced its ability to initiate and direct criminal investigations despite continued practical impediments, and a judicial system which remains in need of substantial reform.

On December 8, the General Assembly unanimously voted to extend the mandate of the UN component of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) until December 31, 1999 (Resolution 53/95). MICIVIH supports the promotion and protection of human rights. It also provides reporting, technical assistance, and expert recommendations that have enhanced the effectiveness of the HNP and the broader Haitian justice sys-

tem. MICIVIH operates under a dual mandate from the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Resolution of numerous outstanding political and economic issues would help quicken the pace of progress within the HNP. The most serious of these issues is the impasse between the executive and legislative branches which has lasted more than 18 months. President Preval and the political parties are engaged in talks to attempt to resolve the crisis. The U.S. Government and international community are urging free and early legislative elections as a path forward. During this period of political tension, the HNP has acted professionally and promoted an atmosphere of calm.

Other Areas

Afghanistan

The UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) and UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi continued to be the primary players in international efforts to end the civil war in Afghanistan. UNSMA's ability to fulfill its mission of promoting a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan was hindered in the latter half of 1998 by deteriorating security conditions for UN and other international workers. In July, two Afghan UN employees were killed in Jalalabad; the following month an UNSMA official was killed and another seriously wounded in a deliberate attack in Kabul. The United Nations pulled all international staff out of Afghanistan after the U.S. missile raid on terrorist training camps in Khost on August 20.

The Group of Six plus Two (Afghanistan's immediate neighbors plus the United States and Russia), organized by Special Envoy Brahimi in October 1997, became a major vehicle for international involvement in Afghanistan in 1998. The Secretary General convened and chaired the first Six plus Two Ministerial on September 21. The Group endorsed a set of "Points of Common Understanding" as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the war.

The four presidential statements and two resolutions (Resolutions 1193 and 1214) issued by the Security Council on Afghanistan in 1998 called for the establishment of a broad-based representative government in Afghanistan that respects international norms of behavior, including combating terrorism and narcotics and protecting human rights, especially the rights of women and minorities. Terrorism was a major focus of U.S. interventions on Afghanistan. The United States underscored the Council's demands that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice.

A General Assembly resolution on the situation in Afghanistan, co-sponsored by the United States, chastised the Taliban for their treatment of minorities and women, condemned the capture of the Iranian Consulate General in Mazar-e-Sharif and the murders of Iranian personnel there, called on the Taliban to cooperate in UN investigations of reports of kill-

ings of civilians and prisoners of war, and authorized the establishment of a civil affairs unit in UNSMA to monitor human rights throughout Afghanistan and deter future violations.

The Credentials Committee of the UN General Assembly again deferred consideration of the competing claims of the Taliban and Rabbani factions to represent Afghanistan, leaving the Rabbani government in the UN seat as its last legitimate holder.

Bougainville

The Security Council, in a presidential statement issued on April 22, strongly supported the Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville, signed at Lincoln University, New Zealand, on January 23 (the Lincoln Agreement). It commended the efforts of countries in the region and welcomed the establishment of a peace monitoring group (PMG) composed of civilian and military personnel from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu. Noting that the Agreement called for the United Nations to play a role, the Council asked the Secretary General to consider the composition and financial modalities of such involvement.

The UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) was subsequently established with a mandate to work with the PMG through December 1998 to monitor implementation of the Lincoln and other peace agreements. UNPOB also serves as the chair of the Peace Process Consultative Committee, which oversees the cease-fire in Bougainville. The Security Council in December supported a one-year extension of UNPOB's mandate, subject to a June 1999 review by the Council of the situation in Bougainville and UNPOB activities there.

Cambodia

The United Nations played a key role in restoring conditions for national elections which took place in Cambodia on July 26. Through a UN Elections Assistance Secretariat in Phnom Penh, it coordinated 500 international observers. It also investigated alleged election-related human rights violations. On September 30, the United Nations completed an operation monitoring the safe return of political leaders to Cambodia.

Efforts continued in 1998 to bring to justice those responsible for atrocities committed in Cambodia during 1975-1979. The Secretary General in July announced his intention to establish a group of experts "...to evaluate existing evidence, to assess the feasibility of bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice, and to explore options for bringing them to justice before an international or national jurisdiction." The work of the group of experts continued through year's end.

A resolution on human rights in Cambodia, adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, expressed grave concern about numerous instances of violations of human rights, including extrajudicial executions, torture, illegal arrest and detention, and violence in relation to political activities. It commended the efforts of the Government of Cambodia to improve access to education and combat child prostitution and trafficking,

but urged the Government to eliminate discrimination against women and create a functioning and impartial system of justice.

The United States and the international community effectively used the leverage of Cambodia's vacant UN seat to press the major political parties in Cambodia to identify a workable power-sharing arrangement by deferring action in the Credentials Committee on competing credentials presented by Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh. Cambodia regained its UN seat when the Credentials Committee, of which the United States is a member, on December 4 accepted credentials presented by Cambodia's new coalition government.

Cyprus

Created in March 1964 to help end violence between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has served as a buffer force between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces on one side and the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek troops on the other since the *de facto* division of the island in 1974.

UN-sponsored talks in early 1998 yielded only limited movement toward a settlement. Subsequent intensive efforts at shuttle diplomacy in April-May by Special Presidential Emissary Richard Holbrooke and Special Cyprus Coordinator Tom Miller were blocked by Turkish preconditions related to the recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state and the withdrawal of Cyprus' application to join the European Union. At the same time, the stated intentions of the Government of Cyprus to take delivery of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system absent serious settlement negotiations or progress on demilitarizing the island further exacerbated tensions. Nevertheless, the Security Council adopted two resolutions on June 29 extending UNFICYP's mandate (Resolution 1178) until December 30 and supporting the Secretary General's Good Offices Mission (Resolution 1179).

The United States continued to promote settlement negotiations and measures aimed at reducing tensions—pressing the Turkish side to drop its preconditions and urging the Government of Cyprus to refrain from accepting delivery of the S-300s. The United States also reaffirmed its commitment to a solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

On September 30, the Secretary General announced that his Deputy Special Representative for Cyprus, Ann Hercus, would launch an initiative with the parties on the island aimed at reducing tensions and promoting progress toward a settlement. Fully supported by the United States, the Hercus effort is still ongoing.

The Security Council on December 22 adopted Resolution 1217 extending the UNFICYP mandate until June 30, 1999. The Security Council also adopted Resolution 1218, strongly endorsing the September 30 initiative and calling for continued intensive efforts with the parties. President Clinton—along with a number of European leaders—issued a statement endorsing the resolution and committing U.S. support for its

implementation. In response, Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides announced on December 29 his decision to divert the S-300 missiles from Cyprus to Greece.

Georgia

First established in August 1993, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) monitored compliance with a cease-fire agreement reached between the Republic of Georgia and Abkhaz separatists the previous month. A resumption of fighting, followed by a second cease-fire agreement in July 1994, resulted in the expansion of UNOMIG's size (to 136 military observers) and scope of operations, to include both monitoring the cease-fire and observing the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping force. As of December 1998, UNOMIG consisted of 98 military observers from 22 countries, including two from the United States.

On July 31, 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1124 extending UNOMIG's mandate until January 31, 1998. Security Council Resolution 1150 (January 30) renewed the UNOMIG mandate until July 31. On July 30, the Security Council again extended (by Resolution 1187) the mission's mandate, until January 31, 1999, with the stipulation that the Security Council should, during this period, conduct a review of the mission, taking into account progress achieved and the adequacy of security for UNOMIG operations.

During 1998, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Liviu Bota, and the "Friends of the Secretary General" vigorously pressed the parties to resolve such key issues as the return of internally displaced persons and the future political status of Abkhazia, but the two sides made scant progress. As part of the UN-led peace negotiations, Bota hosted talks between the parties in July and December. The Geneva talks proved inconclusive, but the sides agreed to follow-up meetings (including a "confidence-building" conference held in Athens in October) and intensified their own bilateral discussions.

Bota also brokered a cease-fire agreement in the wake of a late-May outbreak of fighting between the Abkhaz militia and Georgian partisans in the Gali sector of Abkhazia. The fighting represented the first serious cease-fire violation in years. As a result of the May 25 cease-fire agreement, UNOMIG resumed limited patrolling—after a several month break due to adverse security conditions and inadequate force protection.

UNOMIG security and the need for force protection remained major preoccupations throughout the year. A January 1998 assault on an American military observer, followed by a February attack on the UNOMIG headquarters facility, prompted the United States to withdraw its observers from the area of operations and to advise the United Nations that they would not return until adequate force protection measures were in place. In response, the United Nations undertook a thorough security review and recommended significant security upgrades, including a special protective unit for UNOMIG. Continuing Abkhaz and Russian opposition to such a

unit forced the mission to rely on other measures (e.g., additional mine-protected vehicles, limited patrols, and additional security guards) to enhance security.

India/Pakistan

The Security Council, in presidential statements issued on May 14 and May 29, strongly deplored nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998, urged India and Pakistan to refrain from further tests, and expressed its concern at the effects on peace and stability in the region. A communiqué issued by the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) on June 4 laid out a comprehensive set of benchmarks to prevent a destabilizing nuclear arms race in South Asia, to encourage immediate action to reduce tensions and address disputes peacefully, and to maintain a strong global non-proliferation regime.

Security Council Resolution 1172, adopted on June 6, endorsed the objectives outlined in the P-5 communiqué. Among these were measures intended to reduce tensions immediately and avoid provocative actions by India and Pakistan; actions important in the short-term to avoid a nuclear and missile arms race, put a cap on nuclear weapons and missile development, and encourage serious efforts to resolve outstanding differences through dialogue; and longer-term actions to sustain and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime (such as India and Pakistan adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states). In the category of key short-term actions by India and Pakistan, the most urgent focus of diplomatic efforts by the United States and other key players are: an end to nuclear testing and prompt signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without conditions; an end to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and positive participation in negotiation on a fissile material cutoff treaty; non-deployment of missiles or aircraft capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; controls on the export of sensitive materials; and resumption of their dialogue on outstanding disputes, including Kashmir.

High priorities for the United States were bolstering the international non-proliferation regime and maintaining pressure on India and Pakistan to take the steps outlined by the P-5 and Security Council, and shortly afterward by the G-8—the Group of 7 (U.S., Canada, Japan, U.K., France, Germany, and Italy) plus Russia. A particular focus of U.S. efforts was to counter Indian and Pakistani attempts to deflect attention from their nuclear tests by raising the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calling for disarmament by the declared nuclear-weapon states.

A resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 4 by a vote of 118 (U.S.) to 9, with 33 abstentions (Resolution 53/77G) deplored nuclear testing in India and Pakistan, noted the moratoria on further testing declared by those countries and their willingness to enter into legal commitments, and reiterated that those legal commitments should be expressed through signature and ratification of the CTBT. At the formal request of the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament,

India and Pakistan dropped their opposition to a First Committee resolution in the General Assembly supporting negotiations for a fissile material cutoff treaty after blocking adoption of a text for the past five years. The resolution (53/77I), which was cosponsored by the United States, was subsequently passed by consensus. However, a resolution on the CTBT failed when India and Pakistan refused to withdraw “killer amendments,” thus forcing the cosponsors of the resolution to withdraw the draft. The General Assembly has placed the CTBT on the agenda for its 54th session.

Tajikistan

Established in December 1994, the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) has as its primary responsibilities monitoring the implementation of the September 1994 cease-fire agreement between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), investigating allegations of cease-fire violations, and assisting in the implementation of a peace accord (General Agreement) signed between the parties in June 1997. As a result of the signing of the General Agreement and subsequent efforts by the Commission of National Reconciliation to implement it, the Security Council, on November 15, 1997, adopted Resolution 1138 extending UNMOT’s mandate for six months and expanding the mission’s size and scope of operations. Subsequently, UNMOT’s mandate was renewed for additional six-month periods on May 14 (Resolution 1167) and November 12 (Resolution 1206).

Although behind schedule in achieving all the objectives of the 1997 General Agreement, the parties, supported by UNMOT, made considerable progress in the overall peace process in 1998. Successes included the repatriation of remaining opposition fighters from Afghanistan, the inclusion of numerous opposition figures in key government positions, the return of most refugees to Tajikistan, and the continuing registration of former combatants. There was visible evidence of cooperation between the two sides, demonstrated by the passage in November of a political party law (effectively lifting the ban on most opposition parties). The Government and the UTO also cooperated in suppressing an armed challenge by renegade elements in the northern province of Leninabad the same month.

The Leninabad uprising represented but one of several potentially destabilizing events in 1998. Another was the July 20 murder of four UNMOT personnel in eastern Tajikistan. These killings had significant repercussions for UNMOT and its role in implementing the peace accord, prompting a reduction in numbers and activities outside the capital area. UNMOT’s mandate allowed for 120 military observers, but due to existing security concerns, the mission never consisted of more than 80 military observers during the year. No Americans participated in the operation.

The Former Yugoslavia

The United States in 1998 continued its leadership in the Security Council concerning the former Yugoslavia, supporting UN objectives in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Many of the Council actions were in support of implementation of the 1995 U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, which led to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in response to the crisis in Kosovo.

The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), in Croatia, terminated January 15, 1998, and was succeeded immediately by a reduced civilian police presence, the UN Police Support Group (UNPSG), in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1145 of December 19, 1997. On February 13, 1998, the President of the Security Council issued a presidential statement which welcomed the successful completion of UNTAES and paid tribute to the dedicated men and women who participated in the peacekeeping operation. The Security Council remained actively interested in developments in Eastern Slavonia. On March 6, the President of the Security Council issued a presidential statement expressing the Council's concern about the Croatian Government's lack of compliance with its international obligations. The statement also called on Croatia to reaffirm and demonstrate its commitment to fulfill all its obligations, in particular the obligation to ensure the safety, security, and rights of all Croatian citizens, and to build confidence among the Serb community throughout Croatia. On July 2, the Security Council President again issued a statement on behalf of the Council welcoming the June 20 adoption by Croatia of a nationwide refugee and displaced persons return program and called for its prompt and full implementation.

The UNPSG passed its police monitoring responsibilities to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on October 15, under the OSCE's existing mandate in Croatia. This steady international presence and smooth transfer of responsibility from the United Nations to a capable regional organization constituted a model for bringing a UN peacekeeping mission to a successful conclusion and for helping a society move from conflict toward peace and democratization. On November 6, the President of the Security Council issued a presidential statement commending the UNTAES and UNPSG contributions to regional peace and called on the Croatian Government to take steps for continued improvement of the overall security situation in the Danube region.

Since 1992, the United Nations has maintained a security regime to monitor the demilitarization of the strategic Prevlaka Peninsula in Croatia overlooking the Bay of Kotor. Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agreed to the demilitarization of the area in order to keep conflict from spreading in the Balkan region, and the United Nations established a 14-person military observer mission (Resolution 779) under the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to monitor it. In 1996, an independent mission was established, increased to 28 observers, and renamed the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) by Resolution 1038. In 1998, the UNMOP mandate was renewed by Resolution 1147 on Janu-

ary 13, and again on July 15 by Resolution 1183, which extended the mission through January 15, 1999.

Together with other Security Council members, the United States has consistently called upon the parties to negotiate a settlement of their dispute over Prevlaka. Three rounds of bilateral talks in 1998 yielded no substantive progress, largely due to reluctance on the Yugoslav (Serbian) side to engage seriously. In late 1998, the United States offered to help mediate negotiations. Croatia accepted, but by year's end, the FRY had not.

The November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina brought to an end the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II. In Annex 11 of the accords ("Agreement on International Police Task Force"), the parties requested a UN civilian police operation to help them address the need for adequate public security. The Security Council established the International Police Task Force (IPTF) under UN Security Council Resolution 1035 of December 21, 1995, to monitor law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations; to advise and train law enforcement personnel; and to advise on organization of law enforcement agencies. IPTF was placed under an umbrella civilian mission, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

In 1998, Resolution 1168 of May 21 added 30 specialized police to IPTF, bringing IPTF's authorized level to 2,057 civilian police (about 200 from the United States). Resolution 1174 of June 15 extended the NATO-led (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) multinational stabilization force, UNMIBH, and IPTF for another year. At U.S. urging, IPTF took steps to address its own management problems, making significant improvements and bringing in higher quality monitors. The specialized police advisers (counter-narcotics, organized crime) were notably high quality and well received. The United States supported and encouraged IPTF reform efforts, both in the field and before the United Nations, but more remained to be done.

On July 16 under Resolution 1184, UNMIBH was given the task of monitoring and assessing the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of a legal reform program outlined by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which monitors civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords. The "Judicial System Assessment Program" got under way in October and, by year's end, was identifying problems with the court system and recommending solutions to the international community, in particular to OHR.

On March 19, the President of the Security Council issued a presidential statement, on behalf of the Council, welcoming the Arbitral Tribunal's March 15 decision related to the disputed city of Brcko, and underscored the importance of prompt and full cooperation by the parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement in carrying out their commitments to implement the Agreement in its entirety, including full cooperation with the International Supervisor for Brcko.

Created in March 1995 as one of the successors to UNPROFOR, the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) continued through 1998 to monitor the borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and to prevent the spread of regional conflict into the FYROM.

The Security Council adopted Resolution 1142 on December 4, 1997, which extended UNPREDEP's mandate for nine months until August 31, 1998, while at the same time reducing troop levels from 1,050 to 750. Anticipating that, as a result of improved security conditions in the region, this could be the last renewal of the UNPREDEP mandate, the Security Council asked the Secretary General to report by June 1, 1998, on modalities for the termination of the mission.

Instead, worsening conditions in Kosovo since late February 1998 increased concerns about the danger of a spillover of ethnic unrest to FYROM. In June 1998, the Secretary General recommended a further extension of UNPREDEP, coupled with an increase in authorized troops to the original level of 1,050. On July 21, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1186 increasing the troop strength of UNPREDEP to 1,050 as recommended by the Secretary General and extending its mandate for a 6-month period until February 28, 1999.

The United States has been focused on Kosovo as a potential flash point for more than a decade. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, then President of Serbia, declared a state of emergency in Kosovo. This paved the way for Serbia to force Kosovo's Assembly to accept a new constitution that annulled Kosovo's status as an autonomous province of Serbia and paved the way for the creation of the Kosovar independence movement. In the face of U.S. and international concern about Kosovo, Milosevic raised the stakes in 1998 by instituting a crackdown against the civilian population of Kosovo, killing hundreds of people, and driving thousands from their homes. At one time, an estimated 300,000 internally displaced Kosovars fled their homes, and 60,000 were living in the open without shelter.

On March 31, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160 with a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention, calling upon the FRY to take immediate steps to achieve a political solution to the crisis of Kosovo, and endorsed the principle that any political settlement should be based upon an enhanced status for Kosovo that would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration. In Resolution 1160, the Council also imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. On August 24, the President of the Security Council issued a presidential statement on behalf of the Council which expressed growing concern over the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo, called for an immediate cease-fire, and urged both the authorities of the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue leading to a negotiated political solution. The Security Council next adopted Resolution 1199 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention, on September 23, endorsing an international diplomatic monitoring presence in Kosovo, and demanding

that all parties immediately cease hostilities, enter into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions, and facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. Resolution 1199 also required that the FRY authorities institute specific concrete measures toward achieving a political settlement of the Kosovo crisis. On October 24, after agreement was reached between the FRY Government and the OSCE and NATO, the United Nations adopted Resolution 1203, by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions, endorsing the creation of an OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission and a NATO air verification mission.

The Security Council adopted three resolutions concerning the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) during 1998. On May 13, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1166 to add one additional trial chamber of three judges to the Tribunal. The resolution again urged all states to cooperate fully with the Tribunal in accordance with the obligations under Resolution 827 (1993), which established ICTY. The U.S. Representative called the resolution an affirmation of the important work already completed by the Tribunal and of the still daunting task at hand. He also called upon all states to enhance their cooperation with the Tribunal to ensure that all indictees are brought to justice as swiftly as possible.

On November 17, the Council adopted Resolution 1207, by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention, in response to letters sent to the Council by the President of the Tribunal (American citizen Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonnell), reporting on the continued failure of the Government of the FRY to cooperate fully with the Tribunal. The resolution reiterated the Council's decision that all states should cooperate fully with the Tribunal, including the obligation to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by an ICTY trial chamber, to execute arrest warrants transmitted to them by the Tribunal, and to comply with its requests for information and investigations. The resolution condemned the FRY's failure to execute arrest warrants issued against three individuals (known as the Vukovar-3) and demanded the immediate execution of those warrants. In addition, Resolution 1207 calls for the leaders of the FRY and of the Kosovo Albanian community to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor in the investigation of all possible violations within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The Council, in accordance with article 13(d) of the ICTY Statute, adopted Resolution 1191 to forward nominations for Tribunal judges to the General Assembly to fill three vacancies. The resolution also recalled Resolutions 1166 (1998), 827 (1993), and 808 (1993).

Special Political Issues

International Peace and Security

In 1998, the U.S. Government continued to base decisions on the establishment of UN peacekeeping operations on Presidential Decision Directive 25 criteria, including a review of costs, size, risk, mandate, and exit strategies. The size and number of UN peacekeeping operations was

relatively stable, with approximately 14,000 UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide.

In the Balkans, the small UN civilian police mission, which had succeeded the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, terminated on schedule in October. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, taking on a new role in civilian police monitoring, then picked up the task of working with the Croatian police. The UN Preventive Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued to deter spillover of the conflict in Kosovo, while the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina worked to promote even-handed security critical to a self-sustaining peace. Peacekeeping operations continued in the Middle East, Haiti, Cyprus, Georgia, Tajikistan, and along the border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.

The Security Council established two new peacekeeping operations in Africa. The first, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic, is meant to provide security to permit the government of that country to undertake military and economic reforms. The second, the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), was established after the restoration of the elected government and is working closely with the West African Military Observer Group, which is fighting the rebel forces.

There was a serious escalation of armed conflict in Africa, which may bring increased requests for peacekeeping operations in 1999. In Angola, widespread fighting broke out by the end of the year, following a breakdown in implementation of the Lusaka Protocols. This was largely due to the reluctance of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to cede administrative control over its areas. As 1998 ended, in light of the inability of MONUA (UN Observer Mission in Angola) to fulfill its peacekeeping mandate, the Security Council was exploring what form of continued UN presence might make sense if MONUA was not renewed in February 1999, and began working with the Government of Angola on a framework for a possible residual UN mission. In Sierra Leone, the rebels stepped up their attacks in the latter part of the year, and UNOMSIL drew down in size as security conditions deteriorated and impeded its ability to carry out its mandate. The Security Council also expressed its concern about the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia and supported efforts to negotiate a resolution. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an attempt by dissident army units and foreign troops to overthrow the government sparked military intervention from many countries in the region, some on the side of the government, others on that of the rebels. Organization of African Unity and regional efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and to establish a process to resolve the internal and external conflicts were ongoing.

U.S. efforts to improve UN peacekeeping in the area of civilian police (CIVPOL) operations made considerable progress during 1998. The Special Protection Unit deployed to Haiti (UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti) proved successful in providing security without the presence of

troops. At U.S. urging, the United Nations continued to address recruitment, training, planning, and operations management for CIVPOL. In March, the United Nations sponsored a seminar, "The Role of Police in Peacekeeping Operations," which generated international interest in CIVPOL reform. As a follow-up, the U.S. Government and Argentina co-hosted a civilian police workshop in December which focused on strategic planning for CIVPOL operations and produced the "International Police Planning Guide." The U.S. Government continues to emphasize recruitment and performance standards and field reforms.

Force protection issues remain a high priority for the U.S. Government when supporting UN peacekeeping. In the wake of the spring 1998 terrorist incidents in Georgia which affected UN military observers (UNMOs), the United States closely scrutinized the security conditions within the UN Observer Mission in Georgia operational areas and force protection measures available to assigned UNMOs. At the urging of the U.S. Government, additional force protection measures were implemented but remain insufficient for the mission to resume full-scale operations. The U.S. Government insists upon deployment of a protection unit but meets with stiff Russian opposition.

In 1997, the U.S. Government announced its "Demining 2010 Initiative." The effort is a call for global commitment and cooperation to eliminate landmines threatening civilian populations worldwide by the year 2010. It further aims to increase public and private resources devoted to demining worldwide to \$1 billion per year. In May 1998, the U.S. Government hosted the Global Humanitarian Demining 2010 Initiative Conference in Washington, DC.

During 1998, the U.S. Government continued to provide support to UN Humanitarian Demining, contributing \$2.2 million to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. Also, the U.S. Government provided humanitarian demining assistance worth nearly \$92 million to 21 countries in Asia, Africa, Central America, and Eastern Europe.

Disarmament Issues

Disarmament Commission

As mandated by the UN General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) provides a forum for deliberation on disarmament issues when the Assembly is not in session. The UNDC, traditionally operating by consensus, considers and makes recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament, and follows up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the General Assembly and special sessions devoted to disarmament. The 1998 UNDC met April 6-28 and formed working groups to consider three agenda items, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) and the Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned," "The Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly

Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV),” and “Guidelines on Conventional Arms Control/Limitation and Disarmament with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace,” in the context of General Assembly Draft Resolution A/C. 1/51/L.38/Rev.1.

Consensus on a chairman’s text on SSOD-IV’s objectives and agenda was blocked in the final substantive meeting of the UNDC session. While most of the delegations were prepared to support the paper, a small number of states blocked consensus because, in their opinion, the paper did not reaffirm the principles and priorities of the SSOD-I final document and it did not provide an explicit review and assessment of that document. The United States continues to support an SSOD-IV only if the agenda is adopted by consensus and if the session is forward-looking. The U.S. delegation informed other delegations that the United States would require some reasonable expectation that the meeting could produce a consensus result. Though contrary to standard UNDC practice to keep items on the agenda for three years, another effort to reach consensus may be pursued at the 1999 session.

The working group on NWFZs considered a chairman’s paper focused on general guidelines and principles for NWFZs. A revised version of the chairman’s paper will be taken up at the 1999 session.

The working group on practical disarmament reviewed papers drafted by the European Union and by South Africa. The chair used these papers to produce texts on “Practical Disarmament Measures” and “Other Conventional Arms Control/Limitation and Disarmament Measures for the Consolidation of Peace.” The final paper to be drafted at the 1999 session is expected to contain a useful compilation of guidelines drawn from the experience of peacekeeping operations.

Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the single global multilateral arms control negotiating forum of the international community. Despite the fact that the CD is financed through the UN scale of assessments and submits a report to the General Assembly annually, it is an autonomous organization that makes all of its decisions by consensus. The 61 member states are divided into three geopolitical groupings—Western Group, Eastern Group, and Non-Aligned Group (G-21)—and China as an independent member. In addition, in 1998, 44 nonmember states were granted observer status and 25 of these have applied for membership. The CD met three times in 1998 for a total of 24 weeks.

In 1998, the CD showed signs that it was finally shaking off its post-Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty angst and getting back to work. The United States was successful in pressing for the CD to establish an *ad hoc* committee to negotiate a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear explosives. Prospects for resuming negotiations for a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) were advanced when the CD endorsed the recommendation that the *ad hoc* committee be reestablished at the beginning of the 1999 session—as well as the *ad hoc* committee on

negative security assurances. The CD failed to create an *ad hoc* committee to negotiate a ban on the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines (APL) but did appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations with member states on APL. The United States viewed the appointment of a Special Coordinator as an interim step on the way to the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on APL. The CD also appointed Special Coordinators on outer space, transparency in armaments, improved and effective functioning, membership expansion, and the agenda. CD expansion by five new members, supported by the United States, was blocked late in the 1998 session.

Prospects for actual work on most topics seems uncertain, although there remains significant hope the CD will agree to start negotiations on an FMCT in 1999, and possibly an APL transfer ban as well. The G-21 continue to emphasize the importance of CD work on nuclear disarmament. The United States, and others, reject demands for negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework in part because reductions of nuclear weapons are already taking place at an accelerated pace while no international agreements have been negotiated or implemented to promote reductions in conventional weapons, although hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost in conflicts. Further, it is the view of many in the disarmament area that nuclear weapon reductions cannot take place according to an artificially imposed schedule.

First Committee

The 53rd (1998) session of the UN General Assembly First Committee (UNFC) convened on October 12 and continued consideration of disarmament and international security items through November 13. The committee considered 49 resolutions and one decision (to place the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on the agenda for the 54th session), 25 of which were adopted by consensus. Eighteen items were introduced on nuclear matters, 4 on other weapons of mass destruction, 16 on regional conflicts and conventional arms control, and 12 on other topics (including science and technology, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) report, and the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV)). The United States served as the primary sponsor of one resolution (Bilateral Nuclear Disarmament) and cosponsored nine others. The United States voted “yes” or joined consensus on 33 resolutions, voted “no” on 10 resolutions, and abstained on 5. The United States did not participate in the vote on Disarmament and Development, rejecting the asserted relationship between the two.

The South Asian nuclear tests in May 1998 provided the backdrop for UNFC action in 1998. The UNFC adopted a resolution critical of the Indian and Pakistani tests. The other center of attention for the 1998 UNFC session was the “Eight Nation” resolution calling for a “new agenda” for nuclear disarmament. The resolution was originally sponsored by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, South

Africa, and Slovenia (withdrawn). The United Kingdom, France, and Turkey opposed the resolution, as did Russia and much of Eastern Europe. Despite extensive efforts by the United States, most North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and other key allies abstained. The UNFC provided additional impetus to fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) negotiations at the CD by adopting a consensus resolution. Though the draft CTBT resolution was withdrawn by its sponsors, the First Committee adopted a decision to keep the item on the agenda for the 54th UN General Assembly session.

In addition to nuclear matters, the UNFC also addressed conventional arms, particularly small arms. A South Africa-sponsored resolution on small arms trafficking in Africa was adopted by consensus, and a resolution sponsored by Japan on small arms was adopted 136 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions. Resolutions were also adopted on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

Other Issues

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was formed in 1958 pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), which was submitted by the United States and 19 other states. The resolution established the *ad hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and laid the foundation for COPUOS as the only standing body of the General Assembly to consider international cooperation in the exploration of outer space. The Committee has been responsible for the elaboration and adoption by consensus of five multilateral treaties governing space activities and two sets of nonbinding principles concerning the use of nuclear power sources in outer space and remote sensing of the Earth from space. These treaties form the basis for international law in the use and exploration of outer space.

Resolution 53/45, "International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space," was adopted without a vote by the General Assembly. The resolution renewed the mandate of the Committee, endorsed the ongoing work of COPUOS and its Legal and Scientific and Technical Subcommittees, and set the program of work for COPUOS and its subcommittees for the coming year. The UN General Assembly also noted that the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) will be convened at the UN Office at Vienna, July 19-30, 1999, as a special session of COPUOS. The General Assembly called on all member states, international organizations with space activities, as well as space-related industries and national organizations, to contribute actively to achieving the objectives of UNISPACE III.

Non-Self-Governing Territories

Chapter XI of the UN Charter sets forth responsibilities of states for the "...administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." These "non-self-governing territories"

(NSGTs) are considered annually by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24, or C-24) and by the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the UN General Assembly. The C-24 makes suggestions and recommendations to the Fourth Committee regarding implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), specific issues affecting the decolonization process, and the activities of specialized agencies and other UN bodies in those territories.

An informal dialogue between the United States and the United Kingdom and the Chairman of the Fourth Committee was initiated in 1996 in an effort to arrive at a consensus “omnibus” resolution to address 12 non-self-governing territories including the three NSGTs of the United States: American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As in 1997, this process allowed the United States to support the “omnibus” resolution which was adopted by consensus in December 1998.

During the 1998 session of the General Assembly, the United States joined the consensus on the “omnibus” resolution on 12 NSGTs and on “Offers by Member States of study and training facilities,” and supported Committee action on the remaining four NSGTs (Western Sahara, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and Gibraltar).

The United States voted “no” on Resolution 53/61, “Economic and Other Activities Which Affect the Interests of the Peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories” (154 to 2 (U.S.), with 5 abstentions), since economic activity in the NSGTs is not inherently harmful and, in fact, often directly benefits the inhabitants of a given territory. The United States also opposed Decision 53/419, “Military Activities and Arrangements by Colonial Powers in Territories Under Their Administration” (99 to 54 (U.S.), with 1 abstention), because all states have a right and obligation to defend their citizens, and collective security arrangements are one way of doing so.

Year 2000 Computer Problem (Y2K)

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations has been an active member of the UN Informatics Working Group chaired by Ambassador Ahmad Kamal (Pakistan). Through the Informatics Working Group, the U.S. Mission has assisted in the drafting of resolutions directed at improving information technology at the United Nations, and raising awareness of the Y2K problem on a global level. The U.S. Mission provided extensive support to the United Nations related to the planning and organization of the December 11, 1998, National Y2K Coordinators Conference at UN Headquarters in New York. As a result, the United States, along with Ambassador Kamal and several Y2K Coordinators from around the world, have created a “virtual” Y2K International Cooperation Center geared toward forging global cooperation on Y2K matters related to global regions and critical sectors. The U.S. Mission continues to work closely

with the United Nations to organize another National Y2K Coordinators Conference at the United Nations in New York in June 1999 to focus on contingency planning, crisis management, and humanitarian relief for Y2K-related disasters.

The U.S. Mission is currently working with representatives from Defense Information Management Systems (DISA) to provide the United Nations with Y2K assistance related to contingency planning and crisis management for the UN system. The Mission is also coordinating DISA efforts to assist the United Nations Information Technology Services Division with plans for upgrading current information technology and information management in the interest of interoperability and better information sharing mechanisms to serve member states and the general public.